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NOTES
THE  AMBIGUOUS  AMBIGUITY  INQUIRY:  SEEKING
TO  CLARIFY  JUDICIAL  DETERMINATIONS  OF




“How clear is clear?”1  This question has often been asked regarding
Step One of the Chevron doctrine, but its relevance is not limited to statutory
interpretation in the administrative state.2  Many interpretive doctrines,
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2018; Bachelor of Arts in
Economics and Theology, University of Notre Dame, 2014.  I would like to thank Judge
Amy Coney Barrett for her helpful guidance and encouragement throughout the writing
process, and my fellow students in Judge Barrett’s Statutory Interpretation Seminar for the
interesting conversation and inspiration to explore this topic.  I am grateful to the staff of
the Notre Dame Law Review, and to my friends and family for their endless love and support.
1 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 520 (“If Chevron is to have any meaning, then, congressional intent must be
regarded as ‘ambiguous’ not just when no interpretation is even marginally better than any
other, but rather when two or more reasonable, though not necessarily equally valid, inter-
pretations exist.  This is indeed intimated by the opinion in Chevron—which suggests that
the opposite of ‘ambiguity’ is not ‘resolvability’ but rather ‘clarity.’”); see also Michael Herz,
Essay, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1873 & n.31 (2015)
(observing that “[d]octrinally, the impact and meaning of Chevron will depend on (a) in
what circumstances it is triggered, and (b) how capacious step one is . . . .” and noting that
(b) is “sometimes referred to as the ‘how clear is clear?’ question” (footnote omitted));
Note, “How Clear Is Clear” in Chevron’s Step One?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1687, 1688 (2005)
(“[T]he question ‘How clear is clear?’ should have a different answer depending upon the
circumstances.”).
2 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)
(“When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions.  First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. . . . [I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
1371
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including Chevron,3 are triggered by a threshold finding of ambiguity.  The
threshold inquiry by a judge that a statute is either clear or ambiguous is a
critical determination that can foreclose or make available a variety of inter-
pretive tools.4  “But how do courts know when a statute is clear or ambigu-
ous?  In other words, how much clarity is sufficient to call a statute clear and
end the case there without triggering the ambiguity-dependent canons?”5
Though the importance of the ambiguity inquiry in statutory interpreta-
tion is well documented,6 there is no established method governing the
judge’s threshold determination of ambiguity versus clarity.7  In fact, there is
no consistent definition of ambiguity.8  As a result, the availability of the
interpretive doctrines that purportedly depend on a finding of statutory
ambiguity is often uncertain.  Judge Brett Kavanaugh of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has recently proposed a new
framework for determining when the use of such interpretive tools is appro-
priate.  Motivated by the concern that numerous judicial “decisions leave the
bar and the public understandably skeptical that courts are really acting as
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a per-
missible construction of the statute.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).
3 See, e.g., Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare
Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L.
REV. 791, 794 (2010) (“Under Chevron, the concept of ambiguity is therefore central to
whether an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it administers will receive judicial
deference . . . .”).
4 See Ward Farnsworth et al., Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal
Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 257, 258 (2010) (noting that ambiguity is often treated
“as a kind of gateway consideration when [judges] interpret a statute,” allowing them to
consider legislative history, apply Chevron deference, and invoke various canons of
construction).
5 Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2136
(2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
6 See, e.g., Farnsworth et al., supra note 4, at 257 (“Determinations of ambiguity are
the linchpin of statutory interpretation.”).
7 See Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2136 (“Unfortunately, there is often no good or
predictable way for judges to determine whether statutory text contains ‘enough’ ambigu-
ity to cross the line beyond which courts may resort to the constitutional avoidance canon,
legislative history, or Chevron deference.”).
8 See, e.g., Farnsworth et al., supra note 4, at 258 (“To say that a statute is ambiguous
could be a claim that ordinary readers of English would disagree about its meaning, which
we will call an external judgment.  Or it could be a private conclusion that, regardless of what
others might think, the reader is unsure how best to read the text—which we will call an
internal judgment.” (emphasis added)); Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in Contracts
and Statutes, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 859, 859–60 (2004) (distinguishing between ambiguity,
which is “used to describe situations in which an expression can be understood in more
than one distinct sense,” and vagueness, which “refers to problems of borderline cases,” and
noting that “[w]hile all agree that ambiguity occurs when language is reasonably suscepti-
ble to different interpretations, people seem to differ with respect to whether those inter-
pretations have to be available to a single person, or whether ambiguity occurs when
different speakers of the language do not understand a particular passage the same way”).
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neutral, impartial umpires in certain statutory interpretation cases,”9 Judge
Kavanaugh seeks to reduce or eliminate threshold determinations of clarity
versus ambiguity by establishing additional principles to guide the judicial
inquiry: he abolishes the ambiguity requirement for particular canons of
interpretation, and removes other canons from the practice of statutory
interpretation altogether.
This Note will apply Judge Kavanaugh’s proposed mechanism to the
interpretation of the Title IX prohibition of discrimination on the basis of
sex.10  Part I discusses recent cases decided by the Roberts Court that demon-
strate the difficulties with the current jurisprudential approach to the clarity
versus ambiguity determination.  Part II explores Judge Kavanaugh’s recent
proposal for reducing threshold findings of ambiguity.  Part III considers
various interpretive methods and applies Judge Kavanaugh’s proposal in the
context of Title IX.  Finally, this Note concludes that Judge Kavanaugh’s
approach, while most dramatically transforming the purposivist approach,
also has consequences for the textualist inquiry.
I. AMBIGUITY IN THE ROBERTS ERA
In recent years, the Roberts Court has demonstrated a willingness to
consider factors beyond the statutory text in making the threshold determi-
nation of whether a text is clear or ambiguous.11  Consideration of such fac-
tors during the initial inquiry disrupts the traditional reservation of some
interpretive doctrines for cases of statutory ambiguity only.  Richard Re has
described this approach as “The New Holy Trinity”:
Instead of adhering to the New Textualism, the Roberts Court has repeat-
edly and visibly embraced what might be called “The New Holy Trinity.”
This approach calls for consideration of non-textual factors when determin-
ing how much clarity is required for a text to be clear.  Aptly enough, the
New Holy Trinity is itself triply trinitarian.  It revitalizes the jurisprudential
legacy of the original Holy Trinity.  It is exemplified by three recent Supreme
Court cases.  And it rests on attention to three considerations: text, pragma-
tism, and purpose.12
9 Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2119.
10 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance . . . .”); see also G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 710 (4th
Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded sub nom. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137
S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
11 For an empirical and doctrinal examination of the Roberts Court’s early statutory
interpretation, see Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First
Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221 (2010).
12 Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 407, 407–08 (2015) (foot-
notes omitted).  Re’s argument “differs from John Manning’s claim, now several years old,
that the Roberts Court was exhibiting adherence to ‘the New Purposivism.’  The New
Purposivism resembles the New Textualism in that it honors clear text, viewing it as a
‘trump’—but that is precisely the approach that the New Holy Trinity has now called into
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Using Bond v. United States,13 Yates v. United States,14 and King v. Burwell15 as
illustrations, Re suggests that the Roberts Court has renewed the approach
found in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States16 by making the spirit of the
statute relevant to the threshold determination of clarity versus ambiguity.17
This expands the bounds of the inquiry in an undisciplined manner.  This
move is further complicated by the Court’s expansive use of doctrines of
interpretation related to statutory ambiguity, such as the avoidance canon
and legislative history.18  Though the “text continues to play a meaningful
question.” Id. at 408 n.4; see also John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV.
113, 114–15.
13 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
14 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
15 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
16 143 U.S. 457, 457–58 (1892) (finding that an arguably unambiguous statute prohib-
iting “the importation or migration of . . . aliens . . . or foreigners . . . to perform labor or
service of any kind in the United States” did not apply to an alien contracted by a religious
society to come to the United States to serve as a pastor (quoting Act of February 26, 1885,
ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332 (1885))).  The Court relied on “a familiar rule, that a thing may be
within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit,
nor within the intention of its makers.” Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
17 Re, supra note 12, at 409–15.
18 See, e.g., id. at 408 (“To some extent, the New Holy Trinity is an extension of previ-
ous doctrinal trends.  In the last few years, the Roberts Court has made creative use of the
avoidance canon, which calls for the Court to interpret statutes to avoid asserted constitu-
tional problems. . . . Now, instead of limiting itself to avoidance, the Court avoids undesir-
able textual results without invoking the Constitution at all.” (footnote omitted)); id. at
411, 413 (explaining how the Court in Yates and King opened with a discussion of legisla-
tive history rather than the statutory text).  Judge Kavanaugh classifies both interpretive
doctrines as ambiguity-dependent. See infra note 38.  This classification of the avoidance
doctrine is debated; others argue that the canon may be applied in cases where there is a
plain meaning, but it provokes constitutional doubt. Compare William K. Kelley, Avoiding
Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 832 (2001) (“The
rule of ‘constitutional doubt’ holds that ‘where a statute is susceptible of two constructions,
by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of
which such questions are avoided, [a court’s] duty is to adopt the latter.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999))), and Eric S. Fish,
Note, Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation and as Remedy, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1275, 1279
(2016) (explaining that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance “is officially framed as an
interpretive technique—a court presumes that the legislature does not intend to act
unconstitutionally, and so it construes ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional
problems”), with Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV.
109, 142 (2010) (contrasting the avoidance canon with the rule of lenity, which does not
“permit[ ] a court to deviate from the best construction of statutory language”), and Gil-
bert Lee, Comment, How Many Avoidance Canons Are There After Clark v. Martinez?, 10 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 193, 200 (2007) (“Because the avoidance canon only makes a difference
when a court uses it to deviate from the otherwise-preferred reading of a statute, criticisms
of the avoidance canon center on lack of fidelity to a statute’s plain meaning.” (footnote
omitted)).  For purposes of this Note, Judge Kavanaugh’s classification will be accepted
and the definition of “ambiguity” will be understood to be sufficiently broad to include any
statutory text that is susceptible to multiple interpretations, regardless of whether one
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role,” the initial inquiry is increasingly colored by considerations beyond the
words of the statute, as “purposive and pragmatic considerations [become]
relevant to the identification of textual clarity or ambiguity.”19
This move to include additional considerations at the threshold ambigu-
ity versus clarity determination reveals crucial differences between purposiv-
ism and textualism.  Textualists argue that such considerations are legitimate
only when ambiguity exists, such that “when a statutory text unambiguously
points to a specific result . . . it [is] illegitimate to alter that command to
reflect more accurately the statute’s apparent background purpose.”20  Tex-
tualists, therefore, are more likely to make an initial finding of “clear” than
purposivists because their threshold inquiry is more narrow.21  In contrast,
the initial ambiguity findings by the Roberts Court “all depended at least in
part on purposive or pragmatic judgments,” and the subsequent resolution of
that ambiguity depended on additional purposive considerations.22  While
textualism and purposivism operate in similar ways following an initial deter-
mination of ambiguity, the interpretive tools allowed by each method in
deciding the threshold inquiry vary significantly.
The judiciary routinely makes the decision of whether a statute is clear
or ambiguous, but the underlying question—“how much clarity is required
before declaring that a [statutory] provision is clear, as opposed to ambigu-
ous?”23—has been left unanswered.  “There is no metric for clarity.”24  The
line of cases by the Roberts Court relying on the use of the avoidance canon
in cases of statutory interpretation is particularly revealing of the undis-
ciplined jurisprudential approach to this threshold inquiry.
interpretation is more “plain” than another. See supra note 8 (discussing various defini-
tions of ambiguity).
19 Re, supra note 12, at 417.
20 John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2408–09 (2003).
21 See Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2129 (“[F]or a variety of reasons, textualists tend to
find language to be clear rather than ambiguous more readily than purposivists do.  One
need look no further than the statements of the archetypal textualist, Justice Scalia, for
confirmation of this point.  As a result, textualists tend to resort less often to ambiguity-
dependent canons and tools of construction such as constitutional avoidance, legislative
history, and Chevron.” (footnote omitted)).
22 Re, supra note 12, at 409.
23 Id.
24 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 62 (1988) (“The use of original intent rather than an objective inquiry
into the reasonable import of the language permits a series of moves.  Each move greatly
increases the discretion, and therefore the power, of the court.  First, the court may choose
when to declare the language of the statute ‘ambiguous.’ . . . The court’s answer often will
depend on the decision to move past the surface of the language—which means that the
answer is up for grabs and controlled neither by the reasonable import of the language nor
by the subjective intent of the drafters.”).
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A. Bond v. United States
Bond v. United States addressed the question of whether the statute imple-
menting the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Produc-
tion, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction
reached the conduct of the petitioner, who was prosecuted for spreading
chemicals on the car, mailbox, and doorknob of a woman having an affair
with the petitioner’s husband.25  The Chemical Weapons Convention Imple-
mentation Act “forbids any person knowingly ‘to develop, produce, otherwise
acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess,
or use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon.’”26
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts explicitly invoked the doc-
trine of constitutional avoidance: he considered whether the statute in ques-
tion covered the petitioner’s conduct, and expressed “doubts that a treaty
about chemical weapons has anything to do with Bond’s conduct.”27  In hold-
ing that the statute did not reach the petitioner’s conduct, the Court pointed
toward “the background principles of construction that our cases have recog-
nized [including] . . . those grounded in the relationship between the Fed-
eral Government and the States under our Constitution.”28  The statutory
ambiguity therefore “derive[d] from the improbably broad reach of the key
statutory definition given the term—‘chemical weapon’—being defined,”
such that the background principles of federalism actually created ambiguity
based on the “improbably broad reach” of the statutory text.29
The threshold determination of ambiguity by the Court had little to do
with the text itself, and was instead based on the perceived incompatibility
between the statute’s possible widespread application and constitutional
principles of federalism.  “In other words, Bond paralleled Holy Trinity in lim-
iting the relevant statute’s scope to its apparent purpose.”30  For purposes of
the ambiguity inquiry, the plain meaning of the text was not determinative;
rather, other considerations taken alongside the most natural reading
implied an ambiguity requiring judicial resolution.  Application of the doc-
trine of constitutional avoidance thus does not require a kind of ambiguity
that is particularly unclear, suggesting that a finding of clarity instead
25 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2080–81 (2014).
26 Id. at 2085 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1) (2012)).  The Act defines ‘chemical
weapon’ “in relevant part as ‘[a] toxic chemical and its precursors . . . .’” Id. (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 229F(1)(A)).  “ ‘Toxic chemical,’ in turn, is defined in general as ‘any chemical
which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacita-
tion or permanent harm to humans or animals.  The term includes all such chemicals,
regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they
are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 229F(8)(A)).
27 Id. at 2087–88.
28 Id. at 2088.
29 Id. at 2090 (emphasis added); see also Re, supra note 12, at 410 (“So Bond expressly
held that ‘ambiguity derives from’ a series of purposive and pragmatic conclusions.”).
30 Re, supra note 12, at 411.
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requires absolute, or nearly absolute, certainty of meaning.  The canon may
be invoked despite a plain meaning, where any permissible alternative read-
ing of a text may be adopted if that plain meaning provokes a serious consti-
tutional question.31
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, would have made a threshold
determination of clarity and instead decided the case based on the unconsti-
tutional application of the statute to the petitioner.32  Finding that “[t]he
meaning of the Act is plain” and “[a]pplying those provisions to this case is
hardly complicated,” Justice Scalia traced the statutory language explaining
the prohibited conduct and defining the relevant terms and then declared:
“End of statutory analysis.”33  Justice Scalia criticized the majority for its
“result-driven antitextualism” that “befogs what is evident,” and expressed his
discomfort with the “judge-empowering principle” declared by the Court.34
What the majority saw as legitimate to consider in determining whether the
statute was ambiguous or clear, Justice Scalia saw as wholly irrelevant to the
threshold question; the existence of a plain meaning of the text precludes
the use of external considerations to justify a finding of ambiguity or the
adoption of a strained alternative reading.
B. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius reveals a similarly
extreme application of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance that forces
an admittedly unnatural reading of a statutory text.35  In a fractured deci-
sion, Chief Justice Roberts admitted that “the statute reads more naturally as
31 This argument relies on the understanding of “ambiguity” as a text susceptible to
more than one interpretation by a single person.  Despite the presence of an apparently
“plain reading,” which could result in a finding of clarity, the ambiguity concept has
become so broad as to encompass every possible play in the joints of the text: any reading
that could reasonably be construed as permissible besides the “plain meaning” allows for a
finding of ambiguity. See supra note 18 and infra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
32 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2098 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
33 Id. at 2094.
34 Id. at 2095–96 (“Just ponder what the Court says: ‘[The Act’s] ambiguity derives
from the improbably broad reach of the key statutory definition . . . the deeply serious
consequences of adopting such a boundless reading; and the lack of any apparent need to
do so . . . .’  Imagine what future courts can do with that judge-empowering principle:
Whatever has improbably broad, deeply serious, and apparently unnecessary consequences
. . . is ambiguous!” (quoting id. at 2081 (majority opinion))). But see William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1483 & n.15 (1987) (“Excep-
tions, however, do exist because an apparently clear text can be rendered ambiguous by a
demonstration of contrary legislative expectations or highly unreasonable consequences.”
(citing Holy Trinity as an example of “interpreting [a] relatively clear statutory prohibition
leniently in light of legislative history and current policy”)).
35 NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (holding that the individual mandate of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which required the purchase of minimum
essential health insurance coverage by individuals, was not justifiable by the Commerce
Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause, but could be upheld as an exercise of Con-
gress’s Taxing Power).
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a command to buy insurance than as a tax, and [he] would uphold it as a
command if the Constitution allowed it.”36  However, the Commerce Clause
does not permit such action by Congress:
And it is only because we have a duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly
possible, that § 5000A [the individual mandate provision] can be inter-
preted as a tax.  Without deciding the Commerce Clause question, I would
find no basis to adopt such a saving construction.
The Federal Government does not have the power to order people to
buy health insurance.  Section 5000A would therefore be unconstitutional if
read as a command.  The Federal Government does have the power to
impose a tax on those without health insurance.  Section 5000A is therefore
constitutional, because it can reasonably be read as a tax.37
The Chief Justice’s acknowledgement of the more natural reading of the text
was quickly followed by a reformulation of the statute’s reasoning as a consti-
tutional exercise of congressional power.  The plain reading of the statute
was arguably ignored, as the Court did not even explicitly address the thresh-
old inquiry of ambiguity versus clarity.  Chief Justice Roberts invoked princi-
ples of interpretation that are traditionally ambiguity-dependent after
admitting to the existence of a plain meaning and without determining that
the statute was, in fact, ambiguous.38
The dissent, a joint opinion by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito, argued that this reformulation was not a valid move, even given the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance:
[W]e cannot rewrite the statute to be what it is not.  “ ‘[A]lthough this Court
will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it against constitutional
attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the pur-
pose of a statute’ or judicially rewriting it.”39
For the dissenting justices, the Taxing Clause would only be relevant if Con-
gress had exercised—or attempted to exercise—this power.40  Without any
indication of this characterization found in the text, the dissent was unwilling
to allow this external, purposive approach to affect the threshold determina-
tion of clarity or to disrupt the clear, plain meaning of the statute.
Bond and NFIB are just two examples of the Roberts Court’s embrace of
the constitutional avoidance canon.41  These cases are closely intertwined
36 Id. at 574 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
37 Id. at 574–75 (emphasis added).
38 See, e.g., Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2118 (listing constitutional avoidance as a “sub-
stantive principle[ ] of interpretation [that] . . . depend[s] on an initial determination of
whether a text is clear or ambiguous”).
39 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (sec-
ond alteration in original) (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833, 841 (1986)) (some internal quotation marks omitted).
40 Id. at 661–62 (“It is important to bear this in mind in evaluating the tax argument of
the Government and of those who support it: The issue is not whether Congress had the
power to frame the minimum-coverage provision as a tax, but whether it did so.”).
41 See Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2140–41 (“For example, consider some of the cases
that have turned on the constitutional avoidance canon in the recent past: the NFIB
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with the Court’s undisciplined jurisprudential approach to the threshold
inquiry of statutory clarity versus ambiguity.42  Because “[i]f the statute was
clear, then there would be no warrant for using the constitutional avoidance
canon,” the perceived need to apply the canon therefore became a critical
factor in the “necessarily difficult evaluation of whether the text was clear or
ambiguous.”43  The lack of guidance in making this threshold determination
and the malleable availability of interpretive tools supposedly used only in
cases of ambiguity has left the judiciary with an unmanageable—perhaps
even nonexistent—approach to this essential question.44
II. A NEW APPROACH TO THE AMBIGUITY VERSUS CLARITY DETERMINATION
Although the presence and consequences of statutory ambiguity are well
recognized, the concept remains difficult to define and identify in a consis-
tent manner.  This Part will address Judge Kavanaugh’s recent response to
this difficulty.  His proposal seeks to reduce or eliminate threshold determi-
nations of ambiguity by clarifying the task of the judge and removing the
ambiguity requirement from several interpretive canons to avoid the tempta-
tion to create ambiguity.45  Though his proposal more drastically impacts the
purposivist interpretive approach because of purposivism’s willingness to
consider extratextual factors in the initial reading of a text,46 Judge Kava-
naugh’s framework also affects the textualist approach: after the elimination
of the threshold inquiry, his understanding of which canons are valid (and in
what contexts) requires all interpreters to seek the plain meaning of the text
in a modified way.
In his review of a book on statutory interpretation by Chief Judge Robert
Katzmann of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Judge Kava-
healthcare case, the NAMUDNO [Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S.
193 (2009)] voting rights case, and the Wisconsin Right to Life [FEC v. Wis. Right to Life,
Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007)] campaign finance case.”).
42 See id. at 2141 (“Those were hugely significant cases, each of which turned to a
significant extent on an initial question of whether the relevant statute was clear or
ambiguous.”).
43 Id.
44 See Slocum, supra note 3, at 802 (“The lack of a coherent legal definition of ambigu-
ity and the conflation of ambiguity with vagueness help illustrate the problematic nature of
the ambiguity concept in legal discourse, although these issues are peripheral to the cen-
tral problem of how ambiguity determinations are made by judges.”).  In addition, antici-
pating Judge Kavanaugh’s proposal to eliminate the threshold determination because of its
inadequate ability to aid interpretation of statutes, Solan noted that “[p]art of the problem
is that the law only has two ways to characterize the clarity of a legal text: It is either plain
or it is ambiguous.”  Solan, supra note 8, at 861.
45 Judge Kavanaugh recognizes several “ambiguity-dependent canons[,] includ[ing]:
(1) in cases of textual ambiguity, avoid interpretations raising constitutional questions; (2)
rely on the legislative history to resolve textual ambiguity; and (3) in cases of textual ambi-
guity, defer to an executive agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute, also known as
Chevron deference.”  Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2135.
46 See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
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naugh seeks to address the lingering problem in statutory interpretation of
judges’ inability to make the “initial clarity versus ambiguity decision in a
settled, principled, or evenhanded way.”47  Explicitly addressing the lack of
established guidance for this threshold determination, Judge Kavanaugh
argues:
To make judges more neutral and impartial in statutory interpretation cases,
we should carefully examine the interpretive rules of the road and try to
settle as many of them in advance as we can.  Doing so would make the rules
more predictable in application.  In other words, if we could achieve more
agreement ahead of time on the rules of the road, there would be many
fewer disputed calls in actual cases.  That in turn would be enormously bene-
ficial to the neutral and impartial rule of law, and to the ideal and reality of a
principled, nonpartisan judiciary.48
The significant consequences that result from a finding of ambiguity or clar-
ity in terms of invoking certain canons of interpretation create both con-
scious and unconscious incentives to decide one way or the other, and
therefore threaten the realization of an impartial judiciary.49
In order to achieve this neutrality in the area of statutory interpretation
and preserve the separation of powers established by the Constitution, Judge
Kavanaugh proposes a two-step process that attempts to avoid the “problem-
atic threshold dichotomy” of ambiguity or clarity, such that courts rarely, if
ever, engage in this initial inquiry.50  At step one, “courts could determine
the best reading of the text of the statute.”51  Then, “once judges have
arrived at the best reading of the text, they can apply—openly and hon-
estly—any substantive canons (such as plain statement rules or the absurdity
doctrine) that may justify departure from the text.”52
The first step requires that courts read the statute as an ordinary user of
English, such that the “best reading” of the statute depends on “(1) the
47 Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2118.  Judge Kavanaugh describes the basic themes of
Chief Judge Katzmann’s Judging Statutes: “[C]ourts should understand Congress better,
should interpret statutory text in light of Congress’s purpose in enacting the particular
statute, and, in particular, should rely on committee reports and other legislative history to
try to divine Congress’s purpose.” Id. at 2122.
48 Id. at 2121.
49 See id. at 2143 (“After nearly a decade on the bench, I have a firm sense that the
clarity versus ambiguity determination—is the statute clear or ambiguous?—is too often a
barrier to the ideal that statutory interpretation should be neutral, impartial, and predict-
able among judges of different partisan backgrounds and ideological predilections.”); see
also Brett M. Kavanaugh, Two Challenges for the Judge as Umpire: Statutory Ambiguity and Consti-
tutional Exceptions, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1907, 1909 (2017) (“[U]ncertainty in certain
aspects of statutory and constitutional interpretation is affecting the Court, and the vision
of the Court that the American people hold.”).
50 Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2135 (“Under the structure of our Constitution, Con-
gress and the President—not the courts—together possess the authority and responsibility
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words themselves, (2) the context of the whole statute, and (3) any other
applicable semantic canons, which at the end of the day are simply a fancy
way of referring to the general rules by which we understand the English
language.”53  While some canons—those that the ordinary user of the
English language would naturally employ in her reading of the statute—are
helpful to judges in their interpretation of the best reading of the text, some
are not so helpful.54  Judge Kavanaugh advocates removing the ejusdem generis
canon, the antiredundancy canon, and the consistent usage canon from the
set of canons available to the judge, regardless of whether the statute is
“ambiguous.”55  The best reading of the statute instead ought to depend pri-
marily on the general rules of understanding text that would be employed by
the ordinary user of the English language, and the availability of such an
understanding ought not to depend on an initial finding of ambiguity.
The “best reading” of a statute further requires that the text be under-
stood from the perspective of the ordinary user of the English language at
the time of the statute’s enactment.  Though Judge Kavanaugh’s proposal
does not specifically address this timing question, the time of enactment
approach is implicit in his methodology and further cabins the ambiguity
inquiry.  Reading the statute as it would have been read at the time of enact-
ment is most consistent with the allocation of power to each federal branch
established by the Constitution that Judge Kavanaugh seeks to protect:
Article I assigns Congress, along with the President, the power to make laws.
Article III grants the courts the “judicial Power” to interpret those laws in
individual “Cases” and “Controversies.”  When courts apply doctrines that
allow them to rewrite the laws (in effect), they are encroaching on the legis-
lature’s Article I power.56
Seeking the best reading of the statute as understood at the time of enact-
ment allows for the appropriate exercise of judicial restraint in furtherance
of the separation of powers.
Judge Kavanaugh also calls for canon-by-canon revision of the rules for
invoking many substantive canons of statutory interpretation, the use of
which has depended traditionally on a threshold finding of ambiguity.57  He
53 Id. at 2144–45.
54 See id. at 2159–60.
55 Id. at 2160–62.
56 Id. at 2120 (footnotes omitted) (first quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; then quoting
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
57 See id. at 2145 (“But given that several existing canons depend on a threshold deter-
mination of ambiguity, wouldn’t this proposed approach work a significant change in cer-
tain aspects of statutory interpretation?  Not necessarily.  It depends on which canons we
end up discarding.  Importantly, moreover, this is not an all-or-nothing proposal: we could
refashion some ambiguity-dependent canons but not others depending on the values at
stake with particular canons.”).  Judge Kavanaugh addresses only a small selection of sub-
stantive canons and admits that some canons are more difficult than others to revise. See,
e.g., id. at 2145 n.136 (“To take one example, I do not have a firm idea about how to
handle the rule of lenity.”).  His proposal, by refashioning the use and availability of the
traditional canons, also addresses the confusion between determining and resolving ambigu-
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first calls for the elimination of the constitutional avoidance canon, focusing
largely on the interpretive difficulties posed by the application of the doc-
trine in NFIB.58  As discussed above, the sole source of disagreement between
the Justices was the application of the constitutional avoidance canon, the
result of uncertainty regarding the rules of the road for the threshold deter-
mination of statutory ambiguity versus clarity.59  Judge Kavanaugh declares
this to be “an odd state of affairs.  A case of extraordinary magnitude boils
down to whether a key provision is clear or ambiguous, even though we have
no idea how much ambiguity is enough to begin with, nor how to ascertain
what level of ambiguity exists in a particular statute.”60  The capacity of the
constitutional avoidance doctrine to influence the threshold determination is
the prototypical example of the serious problems posed by the lack of estab-
lished rules confining the threshold inquiry.
Under Judge Kavanaugh’s proposed framework, the use of legislative
history and Chevron deference will also be significantly revised.  If the ability
to “‘pick out your friends’—that is, to pick out the result you find most rea-
sonable—[relies on] a finding of ambiguity,” the temptation to ensure such a
finding initially in order to turn to legislative history later will mean that
“some judges are going to be more likely to find ambiguity in certain
cases.”61  By eliminating the threshold determination of ambiguity and
replacing this framework with a “best reading” of the statute approach, the
use of legislative history will be reduced.62  Similarly, difficulties result in cer-
ity. See Slocum, supra note 3, at 811 (“Further, courts arbitrarily designate certain interpre-
tive tools as being applicable to ambiguity determinations and others as being applicable to
only ambiguity resolution, such as the position of some courts, including the Supreme
Court on occasion, that legislative history will only be considered if the statute is first found
to be ambiguous.”).
58 See Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2145.  Re similarly noted the risks of the constitu-
tional avoidance canon in his account of the New Holy Trinity approach. See Re, supra
note 12, at 418 (“On the down side, the New Holy Trinity affords the Court even greater
power and discretion than the amount already afforded under the controversial avoidance
canon and so increases the risk of biased, insincere, and unexpected rulings.”).
59 See Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2147.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 2149 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568
(2005)).  Judge Harold Leventhal is the original source of this “memorable phrase.” 
Allapattah, 545 U.S. at 568; see also Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative
History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983).
62 See Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2150 (arguing that “legislative history would be
largely limited to helping answer the question of whether the literal reading of the statute
produces an absurdity,” a question reached only at stage two of his proposed interpretive
approach).  Textualists note the dangers of using legislative history, including “that the
impulse to make the semantic details of a statute more coherent with its apparent animat-
ing policy—the impulse that underlies classic intentionalism—poses too great a risk to
whatever legislative bargain or bargains were needed to ensure enactment.”  John F. Man-
ning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 444 (2005). But see STEPHEN
BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 99–100 (2010) (arguing that Con-
gress “may deliberately write vague or ambiguous language to secure the necessary votes to
enact the legislation,” and that a court’s use of legislative history in later interpreting the
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tain applications of Chevron because of the indeterminate nature of the
threshold decision of clarity versus ambiguity.63  Judge Kavanaugh argues
that, while “Chevron makes a lot of sense in certain circumstances . . . we need
to consider eliminating that inquiry as the threshold trigger” because the
doctrine has not been confined to cases where it makes the most sense given
the overwhelming breadth of ambiguity findings.64
Although several ambiguity-dependent substantive canons would be
largely eliminated under Judge Kavanaugh’s proposal, some could simply be
applied as plain statement rules during the “best reading” step without
requiring an initial finding of ambiguity.65  Presumptions that carry suffi-
ciently significant value should not be dependent on a finding of ambiguity,
but should simply be applied as the court engages in its reading of the statute
through the eyes of the ordinary user of the English language.66  For Judge
Kavanaugh, presumptions concerning extraterritorial application, repeal of a
prior statute, mens rea, and retroactive application are among several that
carry sufficient value so as to earn their place as plain statement rules to be
considered independent of the old ambiguity trigger.67
Beyond these plain statement rules, Judge Kavanaugh allows for an
extremely limited application of the mistake and absurdity canons—an appli-
cation that the Supreme Court, at least implicitly, also endorses.68  The
absurdity doctrine is a “sound principle, although the alleged absurdity must
surmount a high bar to be truly absurd.”69  The mistake doctrine is similarly
narrow, limited to drafting or scrivener’s errors.70
Judge Kavanaugh’s proposal therefore seeks to eliminate the threshold
inquiry, and, in doing so, redefines the rules that designate which tools of
statutory interpretation are available to judges at particular stages of the
statute is appropriate for the court to be able to “do[ ] its best to make the statute work in
the best way possible”).
63 Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2154.
64 Id. at 2152–54; cf. Slocum, supra note 3, at 812 (“[T]he Court has allowed substan-
tive canons to displace Chevron.  Although these applications of substantive canons are
highly significant because they foreclose the possibility of deference to agency interpreta-
tions, the Court has not yet offered a comprehensive explanation for when substantive
canons should be invoked as a substitute for deference to agency interpretations.” (foot-
note omitted)); id. at 829 (arguing that “substantive canons should be applied in Chevron
cases similarly to non-Chevron cases”).
65 See Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2156.
66 See id.
67 See id.
68 See generally id. at 2156–59.
69 Id. at 2156–57.
70 See id. at 2157.  However, Judge Kavanaugh is careful to note that even though the
Supreme Court purports to now reject an explicit mistake canon as applied in Holy Trinity,
it has nonetheless used a mistake canon of this kind implicitly in King v. Burwell.  While the
Court “used the term ‘ambiguous’ to describe the law, . . . the Court was describing more
of a mistake rather than ambiguity in any traditional sense.” Id. at 2158, 2159 (“[T]he
Supreme Court decided against explicitly using a kind of mistake canon—perhaps because
doing so would resurrect a form of the now-disfavored Holy Trinity doctrine.”).
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interpretive process.  His approach, rather than merely establishing rules of
the road that address “[t]he simple and troubling truth . . . that no definitive
guide exists for determining whether statutory language is clear or ambigu-
ous,” transforms the interpretive process on a fundamental level by eliminat-
ing the inquiry altogether and restructuring the manner in which canons of
interpretation are applied.71  Judge Kavanaugh admits that this approach is
not possible in all cases, for “on occasion the relevant constitutional or statu-
tory provision may actually require the judge to consider policy and perform a
common law–like function.”72 However, Judge Kavanaugh argues, the issue
in most cases is interpretive, and can thus be cabined and guided by rules
that are settled in advance of the inquiry.73  By reconsidering the validity of
the canons and redistributing the use of interpretive tools without regard to
their previous dependency on an initial determination of ambiguity, Judge
Kavanaugh offers a guide to the courts that eliminates the gatekeeping func-
tion of the judge in statutory interpretation and instead encourages an
impartial reading of the text.
III. TITLE IX: A CASE STUDY
This Part discusses possible methods for interpreting the text of Title IX
and its implementing regulation.  Section III.A provides the statutory and
regulatory framework for the debate.  Section III.B outlines the methods of
statutory interpretation underlying the opposing conclusions, with reference
to the related statutory area of Title VII.  Section III.C  compares these meth-
ods with the framework proposed by Judge Kavanaugh.
A. The Statutory and Interpretive Landscape
Title IX is a statutory prohibition of discrimination: “No person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educa-
tion program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”74  This
provision and its implementing regulation on the availability of facilities75
have been the subject of much litigation.  Most recently, in G.G. ex rel. Grimm
v. Gloucester County School Board, the Court addressed whether the Depart-
ment of Education’s interpretation of the statutory prohibition on sex dis-
crimination and its implementing regulation to include discrimination based
on gender identity should be given effect.76
71 Id. at 2138.
72 Id. at 2120.
73 See id. at 2121.
74 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
75 See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2017) (“A recipient may provide separate toilet, locker
room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities provided for students of
one sex shall be comparable to such facilities provided for students of the other sex.”).
76 See generally G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir.
2016), vacated and remanded sub nom. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S.
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In May 2016, the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights for the Department
of Education issued a “Dear Colleague” letter, which explained that the Title
IX “prohibition encompasses discrimination based on a student’s gender
identity, including discrimination based on a student’s transgender status,”
where “gender identity” is defined as “an individual’s internal sense of gen-
der” and “transgender” refers to “those individuals whose gender identity is
different from the sex they were assigned at birth.”77  Therefore, “[a] school
may provide separate facilities on the basis of sex, but must allow transgender
students access to such facilities consistent with their gender identity.”78  The
Department of Education has since withdrawn this guidance, issuing a new
“Dear Colleague” letter in February 2017 to explain the decision to rescind
the 2016 DCL.79  This change in policy is the result of the underlying inter-
pretive dispute: some have “concluded that the term ‘sex’ in the regulations
is ambiguous,” while others have “held that the term ‘sex’ unambiguously
refers to biological sex.”80  Such divergent conclusions are the result of the
undisciplined jurisprudential approach to the threshold ambiguity versus
clarity inquiry.
B. A Variety of Interpretive Methods
Courts have differed in their approaches to the question raised by G.G.
v. Gloucester.  The 2017 DCL first references the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, which “conclude[d] that the regulation is ambiguous as
applied to transgender individuals” and therefore held that the Depart-
ment’s interpretation was entitled to deference.81  The Fourth Circuit began
with the ambiguity versus clarity inquiry, which it noted “is determined by
reference to (1) the language itself, (2) the specific context in which that
language is used, and (3) the broader context of the statute or regulation as a
whole.”82  Writing for the majority, Judge Floyd acknowledged that the
“plain” reading that results from these interpretive criteria is that the regula-
tion “permits schools to provide separate toilet, locker room, and shower
facilities for its male and female students.”83  However, the court determined
that its “inquiry is not ended . . . by this straightforward conclusion.
Ct. 1239 (2017).  The Court remanded to the Fourth Circuit after the Department of Edu-
cation issued new guidance. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
77 “Dear Colleague” Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., and Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil
Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 1 (May 13, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 DCL].
78 Id. at 3.
79 “Dear Colleague” Letter from Sandra Battle, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., and T.E. Wheeler, II, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice 2 (Feb. 22, 2017) [hereinafter 2017 DCL].
80 Id. at 1.  This Note does not address the corresponding policy dispute, nor is it
intended to indicate support of any one substantive viewpoint.  Rather, this Note seeks to
understand the dispute over the statutory text at issue from an interpretive perspective.
81 G.G., 822 F.3d at 721 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
82 Id. at 720.
83 Id.
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Although the regulation may refer unambiguously to males and females, it is
silent as to how a school should determine whether a transgender individual
is a male or female for the purpose of access to sex-segregated restrooms.”84
This additional consideration resembles the New Holy Trinity move made by
the Roberts Court, as purposivist concerns influenced the threshold ambigu-
ity inquiry.85  The court found that this silence is grounds for finding ambi-
guity, as the text can be understood to permit a determination of male or
female with reference to genitalia or with reference to gender identity.86
The Department’s interpretation that the determination should be made
based on gender identity was awarded deference, a direct consequence of the
threshold ambiguity finding.87  In his dissent, Judge Niemeyer sharply dis-
agreed with the majority’s ambiguity determination and reformulation of the
term “sex” to mean gender identity: “Accepting that new definition of the
statutory term ‘sex,’ the majority’s opinion, for the first time ever, holds that
a public high school may not provide separate restrooms and locker rooms
on the basis of biological sex.”88
Second, the 2017 DCL refers to a decision by the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas,89 which found that the regulation “is not
ambiguous” and that “[i]t cannot be disputed that the plain meaning of the
term sex as used in § 106.33 when it was enacted by DOE following passage of
Title IX meant the biological and anatomical differences between male and
female students as determined at their birth.”90  The District Court therefore
rejected the defendants’ argument that Congress’s lack of intent to protect
transgender individuals is irrelevant because of the Supreme Court’s holding
in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.91  In Oncale, the Court found
based on similar statutory language prohibiting sex-based employment dis-
crimination that same-sex sexual harassment was actionable:
84 Id.
85 See supra notes 11–24 and accompanying text.
86 G.G., 822 F.3d at 720.
87 Id. at 721.
88 See id. at 730 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 736
(“The realities underpinning Title IX’s recognition of separate living facilities, restrooms,
locker rooms, and shower facilities are reflected in the plain language of the statute and
regulations, which is not ambiguous.  The text of Title IX and its regulations allowing for
separation of each facility ‘on the basis of sex’ employs the term ‘sex’ as was generally
understood at the time of enactment. . . . Indeed, although the contemporaneous meaning
controls our analysis, it is notable that, even today, the term ‘sex’ continues to be defined
based on the physiological distinctions between males and females.” (citations omitted)).
89 See Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 815 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (granting
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and finding that defendants failed to com-
ply with the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act and
“issu[ed] directives which contradict the existing legislative and regulatory texts”); see also
Texas v. United States, No. 7:16-cv-00054, 2016 WL 7852331 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2016)
(clarifying original order).
90 Texas, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 832–33.
91 See id. at 831 (referring to Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75
(1998)).
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We see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a
categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of
Title VII.  As some courts have observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in
the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned
with when it enacted Title VII.  But statutory prohibitions often go beyond
the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately
the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legisla-
tors by which we are governed.92
The District Court did not dispute that the language of Title VII is written in
such a way that the statute covers situations that Congress did not anticipate,
nor did it argue that the principal concerns of Congress ought to control the
court’s interpretation of legislation instead of the statutory language.  Rather,
the inclusion of same-sex harassment within the statutory language in Oncale
preserved the plain meaning of “sex” as “the biological and anatomical differ-
ences between male and female students [or persons] as determined at their
birth,” while the transformation of the term “sex” in Title IX to mean “gen-
der identity” could not.93  The conflicting opinions of the Fourth Circuit and
the Northern District of Texas reveal the lack of an established method for
approaching the threshold ambiguity versus clarity inquiry.  This disagree-
ment parallels that seen among the members of the Roberts Court94 and
advances Judge Kavanaugh’s claim that this lack of clarity justifies a new inter-
pretive framework.95
The Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community Col-
lege of Indiana is similarly helpful in determining the statutory meaning of
“sex” in terms of both substantive law and interpretive approach.96  Relying
on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Oncale, a related line of gender non-
conformity cases, and the associational theory first noted in Loving v. Vir-
ginia,97 the Seventh Circuit applied a comparative method to demonstrate
that “a person who alleges that she experienced employment discrimination
on the basis of her sexual orientation has put forth a case of sex discrimina-
92 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.  Although there are differences between Title VII and Title
IX, this Note will assume for purposes of discussion that their statutory text is analogous
with regards to use of the term “sex.”
93 Texas, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 832–33.  The district court implied that the definitional
transformation can be justified only by engaging in a dynamic approach to statutory inter-
pretation. See id. at 833 (quoting a memorandum in support of the defendant’s position
that explains how “[t]he federal government’s approach to this issue has also evolved over
time”).  For a discussion of this approach, see Eskridge, supra note 34.
94 See supra Part I.
95 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
96 Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(holding that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex
discrimination).
97 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (holding that statutes prohibiting interracial
marriage violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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tion for Title VII purposes.”98  The majority supposedly rested its holding on
the statutory language and precedent, yet purposivist considerations saturate
the opinion.99  Though its threshold determination was not explicit, the
majority implicitly claimed that the statute is ambiguous because of tension
between the plain reading of the text and “the conventional wisdom about
the reach of the law.”100  Like the Fourth Circuit’s reading of Title IX and its
regulation, this initial determination based on purposivist considerations fol-
lows the New Holy Trinity approach of the Roberts Court.101
In his concurrence, Judge Posner described the traditional textualist and
purposivist approaches to statutory interpretation, but ultimately advocated
for applying a third method of interpretation: “judicial interpretive updat-
ing.”102  After admitting that “Title VII does not mention discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation,” Judge Posner determined that “an explana-
tion is needed for how 53 years later the meaning of the statute has changed
and the word ‘sex’ in it now connotes both gender and sexual orienta-
tion.”103  His interpretation does not seem to rely on a finding of ambiguity.
Rather than turning to extratextual considerations because the meaning of
the text is unclear, Judge Posner argued that modern understandings are rele-
vant in demonstrating that the meaning of the text, clear at the time of the
statute’s enactment, has changed.104  He analogized Title VII to the interpre-
tive method observed in reading the Sherman Antitrust Act,105 which has
“been updated by, or in the name of, judicial interpretation—the form of
interpretation that consists of making old law satisfy modern needs and
understandings” because of changes in economics.106
98 Hively, 853 F.3d at 345, 351–52 (“It is critical, in applying the comparative method,
to be sure that only the variable of the plaintiff’s sex is allowed to change.  The fundamen-
tal question is not whether a lesbian is being treated better or worse than gay men, bisexu-
als, or transsexuals, because such a comparison shifts too many pieces at once. . . . The
counterfactual we must use is a situation in which [the plaintiff] is a man, but everything
else stays the same: in particular, the sex or gender of the partner.”).
99 See, e.g., id. at 342 (“Especially since the Supreme Court’s recognition that the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution protect the right of same-sex
couples to marry, bizarre results ensue from the current regime.” (citing Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015))).
100 Id. at 343.
101 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
102 Hively, 853 F.3d at 353 (Posner, J., concurring).
103 Id.
104 See id.
105 Id. at 352, 355 (“Failure to adopt [the broader reading of ‘sex’] would make the
statute anachronistic, just as interpreting the Sherman Act by reference to its nineteenth-
century framers’ understanding of competition and monopoly would make the Sherman
Act anachronistic.”). See generally Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
106 Hively, 853 F.3d at 352 (Posner, J., concurring).  Judge Kavanaugh does not dispute
that some provisions require judges to “perform a common law-like function,” but argues
that this is a valid approach only when the text of the statute requires the judge to make a
“determination of what is reasonable or appropriate.” See Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2120
& n.12; see also supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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Application of the “judicial interpretive updating” method is limited,
and the dissent challenged that Title VII invites such judicial legislation.
Judge Sykes argued that Title VII is not one of the “so-called ‘common-law
statutes.’”107  In fact, the Supreme Court has already spoken indirectly to this
debate:
In almost any statutory scheme, there may be a need for judicial interpreta-
tion of ambiguous or incomplete provisions.  But the authority to construe a
statute is fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a new rule or
to provide a new remedy which Congress has decided not to adopt.  The
presumption that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is strong-
est when Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme includ-
ing an integrated system of procedures for enforcement.  Both the Equal Pay
Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are such statutes.  The judici-
ary may not, in the face of such comprehensive legislative schemes, fashion
new remedies that might upset carefully considered legislative programs.108
According to the dissent, the text of Title VII did not establish a standard that
is susceptible to a changing interpretation based on evolving values; rather,
the text set forth a rule whose meaning must be determined by “an objective
inquiry that looks for the meaning the statutory language conveyed to a rea-
sonable person at the time of enactment.”109  This inquiry requires that “sex”
and “sexual orientation” remain different classifications because “[t]he two
traits are categorically distinct and widely recognized as such.  There is no
ambiguity or vagueness here.”110  The contrasting interpretive methods used
in Hively demonstrate the malleability of the ambiguity versus clarity determi-
nation and the willingness of judges to depart from the plain meaning of the
statute.
C. The Search for a New Interpretive Approach
The argument that “sex” can be defined to include “gender identity”
therefore requires two interpretive moves under the current threshold deter-
mination regime: first, the judge must raise purposivist and pragmatic consid-
107 Hively, 853 F.3d at 360 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“The majority deploys a judge-empow-
ering, common-law decision method that leaves a great deal of room for judicial discretion.
So does Judge Posner in his concurrence.  Neither is faithful to the statutory text, read
fairly, as a reasonable person would have understood it when it was adopted.  The result is
a statutory amendment courtesy of unelected judges.  Judge Posner admits this; he
embraces and argues for this conception of judicial power.  The majority does not, prefer-
ring instead to smuggle in the statutory amendment under cover of an aggressive reading
of loosely related Supreme Court precedents.  Either way, the result is the same: the cir-
cumvention of the legislative process by which the people govern themselves.”).
108 Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981) (citation
omitted).  The Court carefully distinguished antitrust law, which “involves a substantially
different statutory scheme” and is an area where “the federal courts enjoy more flexibility
and act more as common-law courts than in other areas governed by federal statute.” Id. at
98 n.42.
109 Hively, 853 F.3d at 361 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 363.
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erations during the threshold textual inquiry to justify a finding of ambiguity;
and, second, the judge must, in part, base those extratextual considerations
on the present alleged understanding, rather than that of the time of enact-
ment.  Judge Kavanaugh’s proposal allows for neither of those moves to
occur.
Judge Kavanaugh proposes that courts first seek the “best reading” of the
statute, based on the text, the statutory context, and any relevant semantic
canons.111  Generally, there is agreement that the plain meaning of the statu-
tory and regulatory text allows for a school to provide separate facilities for its
male and female students, and that “the word ‘sex’ was understood at the time
the regulation was adopted to connote male and female and that maleness and
femaleness were determined primarily by reference to the factors . . . termed
‘biological sex.’”112  The disagreement only arises by raising pragmatic issues
not considered at the time of statutory enactment.113  For Judge Kavanaugh,
those considerations cannot disrupt the interpretation based only on the
text, the statutory context, and relevant semantic canons.114  Perhaps the
most convincing argument employing semantic canons—particularly, expres-
sio unius est exclusio alterius—for preserving the distinction between “sex” and
“gender identity” is analogous to the argument made by Judge Sykes in her
Hively dissent to distinguish between “sex” and “sexual orientation”:
This commonsense understanding [that sexual orientation discrimina-
tion is not synonymous with sex discrimination in ordinary language] is con-
firmed by the language Congress uses when it does legislate against sexual-
orientation discrimination.  For example, the Violence Against Women Act
prohibits funded programs and activities from discriminating “on the basis
of actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, sex, gender iden-
tity, . . . sexual orientation, or disability.”115
Using the framework proposed by Judge Kavanaugh, there appears to be lit-
tle reason to alter the plain meaning recognized by the various judges,
regardless of their interpretive approach.
Second, Judge Kavanaugh suggests that the judge ought to consider any
relevant substantive canons, such as applicable plain statement rules and the
111 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
112 G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 721 (4th Cir. 2016)
(emphasis added), vacated and remanded sub nom. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel.
Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017); see also Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 832–33
(N.D. Tex. 2016).
113 See G.G., 822 F.3d at 722 (“As the United States explains, the issue in this case ‘did
not arise until recently.’”).
114 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
115 Hively, 853 F.3d at 363 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (some emphasis added) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 13925(b)(13)(A) (2012)).  The majority disagreed, arguing that “Congress may
certainly choose to use a both a belt and suspenders to achieve its objectives, and the fact
that ‘sex’ and ‘sexual orientation’ discrimination may overlap in later statutes is of no help
in determining whether sexual orientation discrimination is discrimination on the basis of
sex.” Id. at 344 (majority opinion).
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absurdity doctrine.116  While an interpretation that refuses to equate “sex”
with “gender identity” arguably has odd results,117 none of the various inter-
pretive approaches suggest that the result would be absurd.  The other
canons that Judge Kavanaugh proposes should be applied as plain statement
rules are not implicated.118  Again, the acknowledged plain meaning dic-
tated by Judge Kavanaugh’s approach and recognized by the judges cannot
be defeated by the considerations of his step two.  This approach and result is
far more closely aligned with the textualist approach taken in the Northern
District of Texas decision and the Fourth Circuit dissent than the purposivist
approach of the opposing judges, but the restructuring of the interpretive
doctrines’ availability following the elimination of the ambiguity versus clarity
inquiry nonetheless has consequences for both methodologies.
Judge Kavanaugh recognizes that his approach is not always applicable
to the statute at hand: some provisions may require judges to engage in com-
mon-law reasoning and to consider policy.119  He offers several cases “where
the judicial inquiry requires determination of what is reasonable or appropri-
ate,” including the requirements that searches must be “reasonable” under
the Fourth Amendment and that evidentiary privileges are recognized “in the
light of reason and experience.”120  Because of the statutory text, the Title IX
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex is not amenable to this
“common law–like judging.”121  The prohibition does not establish a mallea-
ble standard, but instead sets forth a rule that a judge can only interpret and
apply.
CONCLUSION
This Note has outlined the difficulties of the existing clarity versus ambi-
guity determination and considered the recent proposal of Judge Kavanaugh
to reduce or eliminate this threshold inquiry.  His approach establishes rules
to guide judges’ interpretation of statutory texts, cabining the tools available
in the search for the “best reading” of the statute and revising the require-
ments for invoking many substantive canons of interpretation.  While Judge
Kavanaugh’s proposal affects the purposivist inquiry more dramatically, the
effect on the textualist framework is not absent: the canon-by-canon revision
prevents the textualist from yielding to the temptation to find a statute
unclear to invoke ambiguity-dependent canons and the temptation to dis-
guise purposivist considerations as textualist by including extratextual factors
during the threshold inquiry regarding the clarity of the text.  The applica-
tion of Judge Kavanaugh’s proposal to the interpretive debate about the
116 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
117 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
118 See Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2154–56 (listing several substantive canons that can
be applied as plain statement rules).
119 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
120 Kavanaugh, supra note 5, at 2120 n.12 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV; FED. R.
EVID. 501).
121 Id.
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meaning of “sex” in the context of Title IX demonstrates the promise of the
search for the “best reading” of the statutory text.  By clarifying the task of
the judge and cabining her interpretive inquiry, Judge Kavanaugh’s proposal
eliminates the temptations created by the current ambiguity versus clarity
inquiry and offers a new approach for reading statutes that furthers the ideal
of a neutral and principled judiciary.
